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Social Philosophy and Policy 35(2), 2018). Sparling juxta-
poses office and duties without apparently spotting the
connection (p. 187), and his Weberian dichotomy be-
tween “officeholders and the public” (p. 189) sidesteps the
fact that historically the latter were often included among
the former, because citizens had public duties.
The second definitional issue involves the public/
private dichotomy. I am unsure whether Sparling over-
interprets Machiavelli here. Like most scholars, Sparling
reads Machiavellian corruption as involving “the sub-
ordination of the public good to private interests” (p. 45).
How does this reading relate to factions, which Machia-
velli saw as corrupt? According to Sparling, what is corrupt
here is that citizens become dependent on the leader of the
faction (p. 56). I like this reading, but it does not explain
why, as Machiavelli surely knew, most people maintained
their allegiance to a faction (like the Guelfs or Ghibellines)
even when its leader changed. I suspect that Machiavelli’s
real concern is simply that cities are corrupted when people
pursue nonpublic goods; that is, goods below the level of
the city, including themselves, friends, families, and
factions. This is why corruption should arguably be
defined not in terms of private gain but of nonpublic gain
(Blau, “Cognitive Corruption,” pp. 206, 216).
These too are minor criticisms, however, and in
general the historical focus of Sparling’s book is a great
success. There are insights on most pages, including
a powerful critique of Quentin Skinner’s genealogy of
the state (pp. 6–8).
I turn finally to the contemporary insights of Sparling’s
historical analysis. Drawing contemporary insights is often
difficult, and many attempts fail. Yet Sparling scores
numerous successes. Chapter 1 is particularly strong and
should be required reading for all corruption scholars,
empirical or theoretical. Empirical corruption scholars will
learn much from this discussion. Consider Sparling’s
criticism of Robert Klitgaard’s famous formula: Corrup-
tion 5 Monopoly 1 Discretion – Accountability. By
ignoring virtue, this formula suggests that, without sur-
veillance and threat, corruption will be rampant (pp. 21–
22). Yet people often act uncorruptly when there are no
incentives to do so. I have read Klitgaard’s formula many
times but never spotted this error. Sparling could go for the
jugular here, giving examples of empirical studies that
overlook this point. That said, some empirical studies do
not (e.g., Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Seven Steps to Control
of Corruption: The Road Map,” Daedalus 147(3), 2018).
Indeed, fleshing out such references would strengthen
Sparling’s contemporary insights by showing which schol-
ars do or do not make the mistakes he criticizes. Consider
the fascinating chapter on Erasmus, where Sparling
emphasizes a key idea: “soulcraft”—shaping political
virtue (pp. 20–43). Sparling notes Erasmus’s pessimism
about whether an uncorrupt prince could remove corrup-
tion, because “the very system that he is attempting to
purify is inherently corrupting.” For Erasmus, power
corrupts “not primarily because the unaccountable take
advantage of their situation, but because radical political
inequality raises rulers too high for their own moral
cultivation” (pp. 40–41). This is true, as also discussed
by Ricardo Blaug (How Power Corrupts: Cognition and
Democracy in Organisations, 2010), but when Sparling
criticizes anticorruption policies that only address leader-
ship (p. 42), his claim would benefit from examples of
policies that make this error; presumably some do not.
Likewise, La Boétie’s insights about material inequality
fostering corruption lead Sparling to conclude that this
topic needs more attention (p. 97). Examples would help
here, not least because some studies include inequality as
a cause of corruption (e.g., Eric Uslaner, Corruption,
Inequality, and the Rule of Law, 2008). Meanwhile, when
Sparling infers that people who say “sunlight is the best
disinfectant” mean that “corruption can be cured by
exposing it” (p. 72; emphasis added), I wonder if any
empirical scholars or policy makers are this naive.
Ultimately, drawing contemporary insights is partly
about showing for whom insights are relevant. Sparling’s
valuable book would benefit from more detail here,
whether by giving references at key points, expanding
each chapter’s short concluding section, adding a longer
final chapter, or writing a separate article building on the
book in the future.
Each chapter is a good length— mostly 20–25 pages.
There are some fine jokes (especially about how civil
servants, to paraphrase Diderot, can separate themselves
from themselves, on p. 172). Sparling’s incisive and
insightful tone made the book a pleasure to read. The
book deserves to be studied widely, and I hope a future
article by the author expanding on the contemporary
importance of his historical analysis will further highlight
its value.
The Dialectical Self: Kierkegaard, Marx, and theMaking
of theModern Subject. By Jamie Aroosi. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2018. 248p. $59.95 cloth.
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— Lars Tønder, University of Copenhagen
lt@ifs.ku.dk
Jamie Aroosi’s new book is an original and refreshing
contribution to the study of Søren Kierkegaard and Karl
Marx. The starting point is their shared interest in
Hegelian philosophy, which provides the prism for
a comparative study of how both thinkers envision
modern subjectivity, especially with regard to freedom
and its many obstacles. Aroosi shows how Kierkegaard’s
interest in individual self-transformation complements
Marx’s analysis of collective class struggle and how this
in turn provides a fuller picture of the challenges facing
emancipatory politics. The book develops these challenges
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in terms of what the author calls “the dialectical self,”
a term that in and of itself helps pinpoint the ruptures and
tensions that continue to haunt the quest for self-
government. Rather than aiming for complete reconcilia-
tion, the book shows how self-government emerges when
the individual’s search for ethical authenticity runs up
against the more collective concern for justice and
recognition for all. The care with which the book develops
this insight makes it a unique contribution to debates in
contemporary political theory, especially about left Hege-
lianism and its usefulness for modern emancipatory
politics.
The book’s overall formmirrors the dialectical structure
underpinning its argument. Part 1 (chaps. 1 and 2)
develops the analysis of “bondage” that we find in
Kierkegaard and Marx, respectively. Part 2 (chaps. 3–5)
turns to the conditions of “emancipation” that will allow
modern subjects to escape their enslavement, highlighting
the discourses and legal forms needed to disclose injustices
in the present without falling back into nostalgia for the
past. Part 3 (chaps. 6–8) uses these insights to develop
a new synthesis, which in turn provides a fuller account of
how Kierkegaard and Marx envision “freedom” as a com-
bination of individual and collective self-transformation.
This account is then followed by a discussion in Part 4
(chaps. 9 and 10) of the actual “praxis” that can make
freedom real for those embodying it.
Throughout, Aroosi stages carefully crafted encounters
between Kierkegaard and Marx, which enable the reader
to appreciate their shared critique of modernity’s pen-
chant for inauthenticity and exploitation. The kernel for
this aspect of the book is the relationship between “love”
(Kierkegaard) and “revolution” (Marx), which never
become the same but nonetheless feed into each other.
How this might be the case is the subject of the conclusion,
in which Aroosi provides his final statement on the
dialectical relationship between Kierkegaard and Marx:
“Love is not enough—it also requires thought and action.
This is the story of Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Marx” (p.
192).
Although the general reader will find much to appre-
ciate in every chapter, the real strength of the book lies in
how it uses Marxist concepts to shed light on Kierke-
gaard’s significant but strangely understudied contribution
to modern political thought. The first interesting move in
this regard is the discussion of Kierkegaard’s concept of
despair, which Aroosi links to Marx’s concept of alien-
ation. As Aroosi sees it, despair for Kierkegaard is a specific
experience in which the individual self turns against her
own actions, seeking to “will itself away” (p. 33). Although
Kierkegaard was fond of equating this experience with
religious sin, Aroosi shows how it in fact is a much more
general concept that applies to many more aspects of
modern life, including the ones Marx analyzed under the
heading of alienation. What despair and alienation have in
common is thus the tendency to accept, more or less
willingly, a situation or a set of circumstances that are not
of one’s own choosing (p. 34). For Kierkegaard, this
tendency was particularly present among members of the
Danish bourgeoisie during the 1849 transition to consti-
tutional monarchy, but as Aroosi’s Marx reminds us, it is
something much more prevalent. Despair (or alienation) is
not only experienced by religious believers but also appears
within most modern forms of life in which structures of
domination and exploitation prevent individuals from
taking responsibility for their own lives. For this reason,
we might also say that despair is another way of charac-
terizing the basic challenge to modern emancipation.
The main advantage of formulating the issue in this
manner is that it places Kierkegaard at the very heart of
debates in contemporary political theory. As Aroosi
rightly notes, there has been an unfortunate tendency
to treat Kierkegaard as a strictly ethical thinker for whom
the realm of politics is either uninteresting or a sign of
corruption (p. 7). Aroosi counters this tendency by
linking Kierkegaard’s discussion of freedom to the analysis
of “true democracy” that Marx develops in his Contribu-
tions to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (p. 144).
What Marx points out—and what Kierkegaard helps us
see even clearer—is that democracy is the most funda-
mental mode of political organization, because it follows
directly from the experience of self-determination that
both Marx and Kierkegaard posit as fundamental to the
human condition (p. 147). For Kierkegaard scholarship,
this insight is interesting because it also provides a new
perspective on his hesitations about Denmark’s transition
to constitutional monarchy in 1849. Following Aroosi’s
analysis, we might say that Kierkegaard critiqued this
transition not because he preferred a more authoritarian
regime, but rather because he thought the alternative was
externally imposed rather than actively willed. The tran-
sition, in other words, was not radical enough to undo the
state of despair that Kierkegaard saw as the main obstacle
to true emancipation.
One way to elaborate on this insight, taking the
dialectical structure one step further than developed in
this book, is to focus more directly on the narratological
structure of the transition from inauthentic to authentic
(or “true”) modes of democracy. Aroosi suggests that we
approach the transition in existential, if not tragic, terms,
pointing to literary examples such as Ibsen’s Nora, Job’s
Abraham, and Homer’s Agamemnon (pp. 54–60). All of
these examples resonate with Kierkegaard’s own think-
ing, and yet he also experiments with other tropes and
genres, including irony and the comic more generally.
Kierkegaard does so in an attempt to empower a higher
degree of reflexivity about the struggle—and also limits—
involved in becoming self-constituting. “Power in the
comic,” Kierkegaard says in Concluding Unscientific Post-
script (1846), is the highest mode of existence available
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for finite beings. Aroosi’s book does not consider this
possibility, which eventually may limit its ability to trace
the emergence out of despair and into something like
a true democracy. Kierkegaard’s turn to the comic
suggests that this transition not only entails a certain
distance from the process itself but also requires an
affirmation of the inevitable twists and turns under-
mining the very idea of a clear goal. How to embody this
experience remains a challenge for any account of “true”
democracy.
These comments should not distract us from the many
achievements of Aroosi’s book. Carefully argued—and
skillfully written—it provides a much-needed boost to
contemporary scholarship, showing how and why we must
read Kierkegaard and Marx as part of the modern quest for
democracy and self-determination.
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— Dawn Langan Teele, University of Pennsylvania
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Although countries that adopted quotas have had massive
success in increasing women’s representation in politics, in
the United States today, social movements, the popular
press, and feminist scholars decry the continued under-
representation of women in political life. These disparities
are particularly acute at the highest levels: there are far
fewer women in executive positions like governorships and
mayoralties than in lower-level positions like city council
and school board members. Although there are debates
about why there are fewer women at the top, a prevailing
explanation is that women tend to be less “ambitious” for
political power than men—perhaps because they prefer
not to compete for office (with all the gendered con-
notations that competition implies) and perhaps because
they perceive that they are less qualified to hold office. In
other words, women are less overconfident than men.
But as Kaitlin Sidorsky argues in her new book All
Roads Lead to Power: The Appointed and Elected Paths to
Public Office for US Women, previous studies of political
ambition have failed us in two ways. First, by being overly
fixated on ambition for elective political office, studies of
political ambition have neglected the many ways that
citizens might ardently seek to serve the public, albeit in
positions that do not require competing in an election.
Second, Sidorsky argues that studies of political ambition
have been too focused on “progressive ambition”: a per-
son’s desire to be elected to higher political office. Women
appointed to state-level positions are particularly insistent
that their roles are not political. Instead, they interpret
their work as necessary public service and comment on
how the public role they occupy is an important spring-
board for work in the private sector or nongovernmental
entities. These insights lead Sidorsky to argue that the
women who hold appointed political positions have plenty
of ambition, just not ambition for politics per se.
To craft this argument, Sidorsky studied both elected
and appointed officials at the state level. She sent online
surveys to a large set of officials in these groups and
conducted interviews with some of the women respond-
ents. Overall, 407 state legislators (14.4% of those
contacted) and 1,129 political appointees (31.5% of
those contacted) responded to questions about their prior
political history, current positions, future political ambi-
tions, and demographic backgrounds. From the respon-
dent pool, Sidorsky interviewed 21 women, 17 who were
political appointees and 4 who were elected officials (pp.
25–26). Segments from these interviews and from long-
form survey answers are helpfully peppered throughout
the text, providing a holistic sense of the commitments and
justifications of public servants.
For those who are interested in gendered pathways to
political office, a strength of the study is the careful
comparison that Sidorsky makes with the work of Susan
Carroll and Kira Sanbonmatsu (More Women Can Run:
Gender and Pathways to the State Legislatures, 2013). Those
authors conducted nationwide surveys of state legislators
in 1981 and 2008, providing an extensive overview of the
differences in pathways taken by men and women to reach
their positions. Sidorsky’s survey asks a similar set of
questions, but with an additional focus on state-level
appointees, enhancing our knowledge of gendered path-
ways to office in a new domain.
Like Carroll and Sanbonmatsu’s findings for state
legislators, Sidorsky’s respondents who were women
appointees are older, on average, than their male counter-
parts. Similarly, in Sidorsky’s sample the women were less
likely to be married than the men, and, among appointees
they were less likely to have children (chap. 2). Women
respondents were also much less likely to be recruited for
their offices than men, especially among appointees. And
consistent with other studies of women’s political ambition,
women appointees were more likely to seek or accept their
positions because they were interested in the specific policy
or issue area (table 4.2, p. 89). As in some of the studies that
consider confidence and perceptions about political office,
Sidorsky finds that, even among those who hold low-level
appointments, women evince less confidence that they are
qualified to hold their positions than do men (p. 104).
Yet in contrast to other studies, Sidorsky finds that the
drivers of progressive ambition may be distinct for
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